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Introduction 
This 'forward thinking' piece is not so much a report on a change in policy, as much as a 
report on a policy that won’t go away. 'Prevent' is the moniker given to the strategy of the 
police and the security services of seeking intelligence from the community at large in 
connection with terrorism, extremism and radicalisation
1
. This 'intelligence' can be extremely 
sensitive personal information about a person
2
. Sharing such personal information between a 
school, prison, hospital or University (the latter the focus of this piece) and the relevant units 
of police forces, security services or the Home Office is an extremely contentious business. 
This is especially so since Prevent as a strategy is dependent on highly subjective decision-
making
3
. In a broader context, the Prevent strategy, seen through a particular lens, is a classic 
example of state surveillance contiguous with a threat to civil liberties in the modern era. As 
an information law researcher, in part, but chiefly as a human rights law teacher in a 
University setting, like many in my line of work I could hardly remain ignorant of the 
Prevent strategy for long.  
A government review (even on a region-by-region basis
4
) has been demanded for Prevent 
from different quarters
5
, and this policy piece represents a review of the landscape for 
Prevent in HE at a time when such a review might yet be forthcoming on a small scale
6
. 
However, a recent judgment from the High Court in the case of Butt
7
 which asserted the 
lawfulness of the statutory Prevent duty guidance for HE institutions has possibly robbed the 
campaign for a fully comprehensive review of Prevent of much of its momentum. In Butt, the 
High Court amongst other findings rejected the idea that the statutory Prevent duty guidance 
for HE institutions was ultra vires and unlawful. It had been argued by Butt that there was too 
great a conflation in the guidance between non-violent extremism and advocating terrorism as 
forms of behaviour within the ambit of Prevent. In the words of the relevant guidance, the 
Prevent duty sought to help combat “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values” 
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as a means of having due regard to individuals being drawn into terrorism, even if that 
opposition to those values was non-violent, though still extreme
8
.  
The finding in Butt that the Prevent duty guidance for HE as it currently stands is not ultra 
vires, with regard to the provisions of the 2015 Act, is quite possibly a policy opportunity lost, 
from the perspective of information governance and practice as much as from a counter-
terrorism perspective. A piece written by Home Secretary Amber Rudd in August 2017 
asserted that Prevent is very much here to stay in an essentially undiluted form
9
. The current 
HE sector policy position is one of the status quo, then, with Rudd noting at the 2017 
Conservative Party conference that:  
"We all have a role to play. Prevent isn’t some ‘Big Brother’ monolithic beast.  It’s all 
of us working together, through local initiatives set up by local people, schools, 
universities and community groups."
10
 
The Butt case could not address all possible dimensions of the operation of the Prevent duty 
in HE. For one thing, Dr. Butt had only spoken on campuses as an invited speaker, as 
opposed to an employed academic member of staff with enhanced rights to freedom of 
speech, as the High Court saw it. And counsel for Butt did not employ every argument that 
they might have to challenge the guidance concerned; notably not arguing as a ground of 
review that the guidance had been formulated as a breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty, 
for example
11
.  But the finding that the Prevent Duty guidance relevant to HE is in fact lawful 
(in the sole judgment dealing with it to date) will be a salient factor in the debate over reform.  
It is not the case, however, that the outcome of the Butt case has placated the educators in HE 
who are understandably agitated about the effects of the Prevent duty. Writing in the 
specialised legal education journal The Law Teacher, Joanna Gilmore has urged law lecturers 
to do more pedagogically in order to counter-balance the perceived heavy-handed 
surveillance effect of complying with the Prevent Duty, by directly discussing the nature of 
the Prevent strategy across their courses and in their classrooms: 
"At an individual level, staff members involved in the delivery of teaching should 
attempt to create a safe space for open discussion and debate in order to resist the 
harmful chilling effects of Prevent. This could include, for example, integrating a 
discussion of academic freedom at the beginning of a module which makes it clear 
that respectful debate and discussion, and independent research beyond the set reading, 
are actively encouraged. Students should also be encouraged to discuss and debate the 
Prevent strategy in seminars and workshops, and interrogate the definitions of 
“extremism” and “British values” upon which the policy is based. This would require 
staff to introduce competing academic perspectives on Prevent in order to encourage 
students to express their own viewpoints and share experiences. Such measures, 
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although limited, could go some way in defending the academic freedom of staff and 
students…"12 
 
Controversy surrounding the Prevent duty 
As is well known, community intelligence on individuals collected or referred through the 
Prevent strategy and multiagency processes is a keystone in the UK counter-terrorism 
landscape
13
. But Prevent is not without its critics, who hail from the political left and right. 
And Prevent is certainly no panacea for radicalisation and the threat of terrorism
14
. The 2017 
Manchester Arena bomber, Salman Abedi, was reportedly referred to the security services no 
less than five times because of fear on the part of those who knew him that he was being 
radicalised and drawn into terrorism
15
 - although Greater Manchester Police have stated that 
they were unaware of this intelligence about Abedi
16
, perhaps showing a lack of a link in 
intelligence sharing around the Prevent strategy. However, an upshot of increased awareness 
of Prevent generally is that, following the Manchester attack and others in London and across 
Europe in the summer of 2017, there has been a doubling of the rate of Prevent referrals to 
the police in recent months
17
. 
Publically-available information about the flow of individual referrals (and the flow of 
personal data as 'intelligence' therefore) under the ambit of Prevent is patchy. Figures about 
Prevent referrals from the Muslim community have been misquoted and distorted by 
politicians with an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim agenda
18
. There is undeniably a 
tendency to associate Prevent (whether in HE or otherwise) with the threat of Islamic 
fundamentalist values as the catalyst for radicalisation and personal journeys towards 
terrorism on the part of plotters and perpetrators
19
. The Prevent duty guidance for HE 
institutions
20
  does not draw any specific attention to the Islamic faith of University staff, 
students or guest speakers, and rightly so. Muslim students, for example, can already feel like 
a University is a hostile place
21
. Quite properly, universities have been reminded of their 
duties concerning Prevent under both equality law and human rights law by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission
22
. One issue might be however that the prevalent media discourse 
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may produce a localised suspicion of the discussion of fundamental, if not fundamentalist, 
Islamic values on campus. There is also a basic issue with wider religious literacy amongst 
even the otherwise well-educated in Britain
23
 - yours truly included!
 24
 
The far-right are the second best-known candidates for monitoring for extremism, and the 
second greatest in number, as a source of nearly a third of Prevent referrals
25
. Radicalisation 
and extremism through association with far-right groups is probably fragmenting and 
changing in the UK at the time of writing. This has come about with the decline in influence 
of the English Defence League
26
, accompanied by the formation of less well-known 'splinter' 
groups such as the North East Infidels
27
; through to hateful groups with a disproportionately 
large media presence, such as Britain First
28
 and Pegida UK
29
; and most worryingly, the first-
ever proscribed terrorist organisation of a far-right nature in the modern era, National 
Action
30
. If the Prevent duty guidance for Universities were to be amended to focus on 
particular risks, there would need to be as much of an emphasis on the threat of radicalisation 
amongst young people on our campuses from the far right
31
, and given the emergence of a 
current shift to the right in the landscape of British Parliamentary politics after the 2017 
General Election, with a 'confidence and supply' agreement created between the ruling 
Conservative and Unionist Party and the strongly conservative Democratic Unionist Party in 
Westminster
32
. 
The Prevent duty in Higher Education has been seen as particularly problematic in a number 
of ways
33
. As noted above requires universities to have 'due regard to the need to prevent 
people being drawn into terrorism'
34
, which would archetypally involve academics being on 
the look-out for possible extremism on the part of their students, or the guest speakers that 
they or their students invite onto campus. Prevent has as a result divided professional and 
academic opinion over its value to counter-terrorism work, and its effect on communities on 
campuses. HEFCE have claimed that institutionally, there is strong support for the Prevent 
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duty
35
. On the other hand, the main academic trade union, UCU, had voted for a Prevent 
boycott at national Congress - only to be advised by its lawyers that a boycott would be 
unworkable
36
. There are also in essence opposing criticisms that, one the one hand, Prevent is 
not producing intelligence that is effective enough, or acted upon effectively enough
37
; and 
on the other hand, Prevent is too intrusive, too damaging for police-community relationships, 
and is a 'toxic', Islamophobic brand
38
. 
A failed legal challenge to the Prevent duty guidance in HE 
The nature of the statutory Prevent guidance for Universities was challenged in a recent case 
decided by the High Court
39
; the first specific challenge of its kind to Prevent. One crucial 
issue in the case was that while S.26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 puts a 
duty to have "due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism..." on 
Universities, under S.31 of the 2015 Act those Universities "must have particular regard to 
the duty to ensure freedom of speech...".  
Ultimately, Ouseley J in Butt rejected the idea that Dr. Butt, as one named subject of a Home 
Office press release identifying him as an extremist speaker on UK campuses, had been the 
'victim' of an interference with his right to freedom of expression, under Article 10 ECHR.  
Of more interest to information law students and scholars is the conclusion of the court on the 
issue of whether Article 8 ECHR was engaged on the facts of the case. The court determined 
that it was not. Ouseley J was "persuaded that the EAU did not interfere with the Claimant’s 
Article 8(1) rights, or at least did not do so at the level required to constitute interference for 
those purposes."
40
   
In essence, there was no 'reasonable expectation of privacy' on the part of Dr. Butt given the 
public nature of his expression of his views on a website of which he was editor and 
contributor e.g. his publically stated views that homosexuality is sinful
41
. The court did not 
entertain to any real degree the assertions made by counsel that despite these views, Dr. Butt 
could still be said to be in favour of British values of “democracy, the rule of law, liberty and 
respect and tolerance of other faiths and beliefs.”42   
Rather, the view of the court was swayed by evidence that portrayed Dr. Butt not as a man of 
"orthodox conservative religious views”43, but as someone who compares homosexuality to 
                                            
35
 HEFCE, Implementation of the Prevent duty in the higher education sector in England: 2015-16, 2017, from 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/pubs/year/2017/201701/ (accessed at 13.04.2017) 
36
 UCU, Prevent duty guidance, 2015, from https://www.ucu.org.uk/media/7370/The-prevent-duty-guidance-
for-branches-Dec-15/pdf/ucu_preventdutyguidance_dec15.pdf (accessed at 20.03.2017) 
37
 Paul Wragg, 'For all we know: freedom of speech, radicalisation and the prevent duty', Comms. L. 2016, 
21(3), 60-61, p.61. 
38
 See https://www.easterneye.eu/rethink-prevent-strategy-needed-end-radicalisation-says-rudd/ (accessed at 
12.09.2017) 
39
 R (Butt) v Home Secretary [2017] EWHC 1930 (Admin) 
40
 Butt at 222. 
41
 The court in Butt applied the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test, in order to measure whether Article 8 
ECHR was engaged, and that had found favour in the UK Supreme Court decision in In re JR 38 [2015] UKSC 
42 but which was not deployed by the UKSC in R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland [2015] UKSC 9. 
42
 Butt at 5. 
43
 Ibid. 
6 
 
paedophilia and supports female genital mutilation
44
. But there is of course a great 
subjectivity in a University assessing whether or not a student in a classroom, a tutor behind a 
lectern or a guest speaker on a panel enjoys a 'reasonable expectation of privacy', and whether 
a resulting duty therefore applies to assess the proportionality of any possible referral of the 
individual to the police or security services under the Prevent guidance.  
We might assume that it is more likely that there would be an interference with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy as enjoyed by a student in our seminar should a Prevent 
referral occur concerning them and their views expressed in class; though this is not to say 
that on the facts of a particular case such a referral would be disproportionate - just that a 
proportionality exercise or test would, in the case of a student, more likely need to be 
undertaken as a result. 
Information governance and policy aspects of the Butt case 
The intelligence analysis undertaken on Dr. Butt was done so on the basis of common law 
powers augmented by the Royal Prerogative, rather than as statutory surveillance of any kind. 
In the words of Ouseley J in Butt at 238: 
"It was not at issue, before me at any rate, that the SSHD had power at common law 
or under the Royal Prerogative to obtain, record, analyse and disclose information.  It 
is also not disputed that the absence of a statutory power does not mean that the 
actions are not in accordance with the law.  For these purposes, the exercise of the 
powers must be governed by clear and accessible rules of law, governing the scope 
and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards concerning duration, 
storage, usage, access of third parties, procedures for preserving the integrity and 
confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction." 
This highly flexible legal basis for the intelligence analysis upon which the Prevent strategy 
rests as a whole is an equivalent to the common law framework for the retention of the police 
intelligence disputed as unlawfully retained in R (Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers 
of England, Wales and Northern Ireland [2015] UKSC 9. The European Court of Human 
Rights is at the time of writing considering an application from Catt
45
, but for now the UK 
Supreme Court judgment in Catt renders the common law basis for the compilation of 
intelligence databases lawful and the retention of such personal data proportionate and in 
compliance with Article 8 ECHR. The judgment in Butt has showed us a few interesting 
facets of the Prevent strategy in operation in a closer light, however. 
The judgment in Butt has revealed that the nature of the Home Office Extremism Analysis 
Unit (EAU) is such that it conducts 'public' surveillance of individuals from multiple, largely 
non-intrusive sources. As Ouseley J noted at 182 in Butt: 
"[An EAU analysis form] asked such questions as when it was considered that 
interference with privacy was likely, whether a named individual would be examined, 
whether information from different sources would be pulled together, whether 
information would be stored for a period of time, whether multiple searches would be 
conducted over time to build up a profile, whether it would include information about 
a private life and personal or professional relationships with others, whether several 
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records would be analysed together to establish a pattern and whether other private 
information would be used to analyse the findings as a whole." 
Ouseley J also gave the idea that Home Office EAU intelligence collection was 'proper' 
surveillance that required statutory approval short shrift, observing in Butt at 185 that "the 
EAU’s work did not ordinarily involve extended monitoring over time and had not yet 
become directed surveillance requiring [Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000] 
procedures to be followed." 
Thirdly and finally, Ousely J took the approach that the claim brought by Dr. Butt was an 
individual one, in relation to an individual action by the Home Office EAU to name him as an 
extremist in a press release. This stance had some particular ramifications for the rationale 
applied by Ouseley J overall, and the court's determination that Butt was not the case to begin 
to unpick the Prevent strategy in HE as a whole: 
 "This case is not concerned with the lawfulness of the EAU’s policies as such, nor 
with what could happen to others, who then might have a remedy under the DPA.  
This case is about this Claimant.  If the aim is legitimate, then the interference by the 
research was proportionate to the aim.  The retention of the data is proportionate; it 
may continue to be needed for research and to inform guidance to the RHEBs 
[relevant Higher Education bodies].  The data is not shared with RHEBs or other 
public or private bodies, but even if the precise relationship between the information 
retained and what the Prevent co-ordinator describes to the RHEB is unclear, the fact 
that it is used in that way does not show the interference to be disproportionate, but 
rather that it is being used for the legitimate purpose for which it was collected.  The 
absence of clear deletion provisions does not make it disproportionate yet, since there 
is no reason why in the Claimant’s case, if legitimately collected, the data should have 
been deleted…"46 
It is true that Ouseley J was, in effect, taking the main line of reasoning from the UKSC in 
Catt (that a very broad intelligence picture of criminal networks involving criminal and the 
non-criminal individuals crucially may need to be retained intact, and so can be retained in 
line with the requirements of the principle of proportionality) and was applying it directly on 
the issue of intelligence retention, as arguably he was bound to do.  It is also true that to find 
that a lack of regulation (over the manner in which the deletion of intelligence may at some 
point occur was no violation of ECHR rights), could also be said, for now, to have been the 
correct approach.  
However, the European Court of Human Rights might well determine in a forthcoming 
judgment in the communicated case of Catt v UK 43514/15, should that application be 
deemed admissible, that there should be consideration of whether deletion of records of 
"those not involved in any criminal activities" from intelligence reports would be unduly 
burdensome, as part of an assessment of whether " retention of the applicant’s personal data 
in the Domestic Extremism Database “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a 
democratic society”. But of course the outcome of the future ECtHR judgment in Catt 
remains to be seen. The UK will likely argue for a decision based firmly on the doctrine of 
the margin of appreciation
47
, and there is of course a political climate of great concern at the 
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spike in lethality of terror attacks across Europe in the last few years, which might subtly but 
crucially affect the decision in Catt by the ECtHR. However, if the Strasbourg Court finds 
that the deletion of the records of individuals associated with criminality but not directly 
engaged in it would be required when not unduly burdensome; this would potentially have 
domestic ramifications for the retention of police intelligence in extremism-type databases for 
police forces and security bodies across the UK.  
The UK Supreme Court judgment in Catt had placed a very low threshold for police forces 
seeking a rationale for the retention of intelligence eon non-violent protests such as John 
Oldroyd Catt.  The Strasbourg Court might expect more clarity on how, if at all, an innocent 
but politically (or religiously) radical person might expect to see their personal information 
treated as intelligence given the values of Article 8 ECHR. On a related point though, in a 
recent positive move from the Department of Education, an 'advice note' has been published 
which explained that information about an individual passed on to the police will be dealt 
with only by specialist officers and stored on a dedicated Prevent case management system or 
'PCMS', and so would not be shared with future employers, for example
48
. 
Ongoing legal concerns over Prevent in HE 
In some ways Dr. Butt was a poorly placed challenger to the Prevent duty guidance for HE 
institutions. Neither an academic nor a student, the Court in Butt held at 81 that: 
"The Claimant is not a victim simply because he makes generalised assertions, which 
is at best all that he does, that his rights will or could be breached in the future.  The 
Claimant must show that he is directly affected; as with English and Welsh notions of 
standing, the issue may be bound up with the merits of the case.  Breach goes beyond 
the question of interference, because if he established an interference, the public body 
would be entitled to show that it was justified and proportionate, in the specific 
context, and having specific regard to what he wanted to say, where and to whom.  He 
has no right to go on to a university campus to express his views." 
As discussed above, students and academic staff at Universities in the UK possess quite 
literally a different legal standing to guest speakers on campus, and their 'reasonable 
expectations' of the University as a place for the intellectual sparring common to or 
connected with their discipline affects how we might see their Article 8 ECHR rights engaged 
by a potential Prevent referral. Furthermore, on the issue of potential stigmatisation and 
discrimination as an aspect of the assessment of the court of the key question of 
proportionality as a 'fair balance' between the rights of the individual and the interests of 
wider society, just because the evidence given in the Butt case focused on the position of the 
claimant in judicial review does not mean that there are no legal issues to be found in the 
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adopted, there exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. This assessment has only a relative 
character: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible 
measures, the grounds required for ordering such measures, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and 
supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law." 
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wider practices of the Prevent strategy operated in University institutions today. Informed by 
counsel for Dr. Butt that the Prevent duty guidance for Universities could be more sensitive 
and warn of a disproportionate impact on Muslims, Ouseley J, however, took the view that 
this did not play a role in an assessment of the merits of the case. As for such a 
disproportionate impact on Muslims, in Butt at 151 Ouslely J noted that: 
"That is not a matter of law.  No claim is made that [the guidance] leads to unlawful 
indirect discrimination.  I regard it as obvious that one target of the guidance is 
Islamist terrorism, and preventing Muslim and non-Muslim people being drawn into it 
through non-violent Islamist extremism." 
It is a shame in a regulatory sense that there have not been more challenges to the Prevent 
guidance in order to raise the issue of a disproportionate impact on Muslims as the basis of a 
specific Article 14 ECHR or Equality Act claim. Perhaps if the Strasbourg court does not 
upset the information governance status quo in a fresh judgment in Catt, then critics of the 
current Prevent strategy, such as the Open Society Justice Initiative
49
, could in the right 
circumstances mount such a challenge. 
Conclusions 
Paul Wragg has written stridently that: "The Prevent duty is naked fascism. That it is not 
more readily perceived as such must be the sheer arrogance of the British people to assume 
the power will be reserved only for the right sort of people, i.e., not us but them."
50
  
For me, one view of the Prevent duty is as a reminder that modern totalitarianism has often 
been built on the precise flow of information about people; and this is something to be 
extremely careful of. The precise mechanics of the Prevent duty must surely and eventually 
be reviewed thoroughly, lest it slip into the model of 'naked fascism' that rests upon the 
careful and systematic but ultimately disproportionate and discriminatory collection of data 
about dissent.  
It is fairly clear already that the HE sector on the ground is unhappy with the duties placed 
upon lecturers by the Prevent strategy and the underpinning statutory duties that affect 
institutions. However, HEFCE-backed training materials produced and disseminated by 
'Safer Campus Communities' are adaptable locally by HE institutions, and the argument 
remains that a critical, academic middle ground could be trodden. Prevent could be explained 
and trained in the teaching context, to colleagues, and to students, in a way that is better 
cognisant of the qualities, risks and opportunities of the Prevent duty in Higher Education. 
Prevent is not a policy that could be easily boycotted outside of the limits of properly balloted 
industrial action, given the UCU switch of approach, it would seem. So if training on the 
Prevent duty is in effect compulsory for staff teaching in Higher Education as a sector, it 
should perhaps become something academics have a hand in both designing and delivering 
locally, in all institutions, in order to make that training intellectually rigorous and, 
importantly, as much a space for debate on Prevent as about the local processes to use to put 
the policy into operation. This is the only way for HE professionals involved in pedagogy, 
such as lecturers and professors, to professionally and in good faith contribute on a personal 
level to their employers meeting the competing institutional duties under the 2015 Act, that is, 
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to have due regard to the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism, and to preserve 
academic freedom. 
However, we must remember that if Prevent does not exist in a vacuum in the sense of HE as 
a social milieu, then it does not exist in a legal vacuum within HE either. For example, if we 
were to be pragmatic and accept there was a risk in contemporary UK society from acts of 
terror perpetrated by radicalised, extremist Muslims (however outrageously overplayed this is 
in the media), should it not be a requirement for the Prevent duty training for academics to 
make some space in its curriculum for some time for delegates or attendees to engage with a 
basic education on the theological differences between mainstream Islam and a 
fundamentalist or extremist version of the faith?  
Arguably, this sort of academically-rooted training practice would actually assist Universities 
to better meet their public sector equality duty to have due regard to the need to advance the 
equality of opportunity for Muslims to participate in public life (and namely the public life of 
their university), given the language of Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010
51
. And in this 
way, any over-emphasis in Prevent policy on the need for a vigilance, toward views that 
express opposition to 'British values', would be augmented with something that could 
facilitate the sharing of intellectual views. This would in time hopefully make it more likely 
that we would avoid the dissemination, in wrongful cases, of suspicion dressed up as 
'intelligence'. However, as the consolidatory judgment in Butt demonstrates upon a close 
reading, and in the context of wider discourse about Prevent in HE, there has not been a lot of 
scope for finer regulatory reform to date in relation to the duty in the University setting. It can 
be hoped that any review of Prevent by Government, if it is forthcoming, would do more than 
merely assume that the Butt judgment means the duty placed upon HE institutions is legally 
sound. This would particularly short-sighted given the lack of a discussion in the Butt case of 
the Prevent duty guidance for HE in the light of the Public Sector Equality Duty, and the 
emphasis found in the latter on the need to have due regard to the need to promote equality of 
opportunity for groups of different beliefs to engage with public life
52
, as well as any possible 
future case law on intelligence retention from Strasbourg or the UK courts themselves, as 
discussed above. 
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